

# THE KENTUCKIAN

"TO CARE FOR HIM WHO HAS BORNE THE BATTLE, AND FOR HIS WIDOW AND ORPHANS."

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## BURNSIDE IN TENNESSEE.

## JONES IN WESTERN VIRGINIA.

## BRILLIANT MILITARY MOVEMENTS OF BOTH ARMIES.

How Reinforcements from the Army were Withheld from Participation in the Battle of Chickamauga—The Folly of Controlling the Movements of Armies by Telegraph at a Thousand Miles from the Field of Action.

The sweep of the Union armies, under Rosecrans and Burnside, westward from Middle Tennessee, Kentucky, in August and September, 1862, has been described in foregoing numbers of THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE. The confederates, finding it impossible to confront the line formed by both Union armies, evacuated East Tennessee and concentrated their entire strength upon the Army of the Cumberland.

Burnside pushed forward with the Army of the Ohio and captured Knoxville on the 2d, and Cumberland Gap on the 9th of September. Major-General Sam Jones, in command of the department of Western Virginia, was directed by the confederate war department to extend a protectorate over the district of East Tennessee. Arriving upon the scene of operations too late to prevent the surrender of Frazer at Cumberland Gap, he turned his attention to the formation of a command which should prevent the advance of Burnside's troops eastward, while by a show of force he should be able to hold his antagonist from participation in the struggle then impending near Chattanooga.

The value of the Salt Works at Saltville, fourteen miles east of Abingdon, was inestimable to the southern army. Their destruction would inflict an irreparable loss upon the confederacy. Although the capture and destruction of these works seemed never to have entered into the calculations of General Burnside or the War Department, the head of General Burnside's column had no sooner turned in that direction from Cumberland Gap, than General Jones at once conjectured the objective point to be the precious Salt Works, which it had been his especial duty to guard.

On the 14th the Union troops were reported to be moving from Cumberland Gap on the Salt Works. General Wharton was placed in command of the defenses, and Oney's battery ordered to report to him. Majors Chenoweth and Prentice were ordered to send scouts out and ascertain the truth of the report. Colonel J. E. Carter, in command of the First Tennessee cavalry brigade, was directed to move via Reedy Creek and Moccasin Gap, and "if the enemy moves towards Saltville, get in his rear and harass him."

Inquiries were next ordered to be made to what extent he could rely upon the home guards.

TO PROTECT THE SALT WORKS, with the intention of removing Wharton to the front. It will be observed that the mind of General Jones had become impressed with two ideas, both of which were erroneous. One, that Burnside had but a portion of his force in East Tennessee, having sent the greater portion of his troops to co-operate with Rosecrans below Chattanooga; the other, that General Burnside had designs upon the Salt Works. Both ideas were precisely those which would naturally occur to the mind of an intelligent antagonist, conversant with the importance of both movements, and that he was wrong in his surmise reflects less credit upon his antagonist than upon himself. General Lee, whose mind embraced in its comprehensive grasp the operations of the confederate army throughout the whole arena of war, had already responded to the call of General Bragg for reinforcements by detaching one of his strongest corps, under Longstreet, for service at Chattanooga, and now finding the Salt Works, upon which his army depended, threatened, he had promptly supplied to General Jones an additional brigade under command of Brigadier-General Corse. Wharton's brigade was encamped at Glade Springs, within supporting distance of the artillery in defence of the Salt Works. Corse was brought to the front and preparations made to defend the line of road leading into the valley of the Upper Tennessee, and, if possible, prevent Burnside from advancing upon the Salt Works and also from detaching any considerable portion of his force to reinforce Rosecrans. In response to a telegram from president Davis, asking the strength and position of his forces, General Jones replied as follows:

"JONESBORO, September 15, 1863.  
"His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS,  
"Richmond, Va.

"Your telegram of yesterday received last night. I shall withdraw the troops from this to the Watauga and Holston to await the reinforcements and be in better position to meet an advance on Saltville. No reliable information of the movements of the enemy from Cumberland Gap. Picket skirmishing in front every day, our pickets behaving well.

SAM JONES, Major-General.

General Jones says in his report: "Under all the circumstances of the case I thought the best service I could render with the small force under my command would be to check and detain the superior force in my front until the battle which I supposed was impending near Chattanooga should be decided."

reported the capture of Cumberland Gap and 2,000 prisoners and the occupation of East Tennessee from Jonesboro on the north-east to Athens in the southwest. To this report Halleck responded on the 11th congratulating him upon his success, directing him to hold the gaps in the North Carolina mountains and to connect with Gen. Rosecrans at least with his cavalry, notifying him that the latter would occupy Dalton or some point on the railroad, to close all access from Atlanta. On the 13th Halleck telegraphed as follows: "It is important that all the available forces of your command be pushed forward into East Tennessee. All your scattered forces should be concentrated there. So long as we hold Tennessee Kentucky is perfectly safe. Move down your infantry as rapidly as possible towards Chattanooga to connect with Rosecrans. Bragg may merely hold the passes in the mountains to cover Atlanta and move his main army through northern Alabama to reach the Tennessee River and turn Rosecrans's right, cutting off his supplies. In that case he will turn Chattanooga over to you and move to interrupt Bragg."

Here is a positive order, as explicit as any given to Rosecrans, for Burnside to move his infantry down towards Chattanooga to connect with Rosecrans. The same order had been given on the 5th of August, and had formed a part of the plan of the expedition. It was reiterated on the 5th of September, when he was directed to keep Rosecrans informed of his movements and arrange with him for co-operation. On September 11th, when he was notified of Rosecrans's position and need of reinforcements, and again on the 13th, as seen in the above dispatch, he had in Tennessee a division of cavalry and mounted infantry whose effective strength, as shown by the field returns of September 20th, was "Present for duty, equipped, 6,700, with 34 pieces of artillery." His infantry and artillery, under Hartsuff, numbered: "Present for duty, equipped, 6,585, with 33 pieces of artillery." One has but to imagine the grand results of the Chattanooga campaign if these orders had been obeyed. Burnside entered Knoxville with an army of 10,000 men on the 6th of September, leaving a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry and mounted infantry at London and Athens. He found supplies abundant, besides which he had crossed the mountains with 2,000 beef cattle. His advance, under Foster, captured at Knoxville five locomotives, over twenty cars, and a large quantity of provisions. After capturing the force and subsistence stores at Cumberland Gap and opening the route to and from Kentucky, and arming the loyal East Tennesseans with 5,000 stand of arms brought with him for that purpose, he had ample time and opportunity in which to have dispatched at least TEN THOUSAND INFANTRY TO CO-OPERATE WITH ROSECRANS.

On the 18th he acknowledged the receipt of Halleck's dispatch of the 13th, above quoted, and also of one dated on the 14th, which read as follows: "There are reasons why you should reinforce General Rosecrans with all possible dispatch. It is believed that the enemy will concentrate to give him battle. You must be there to help him." To this urgent appeal he replied on the 18th from Knoxville: "Orders to go below will be obeyed as soon as possible. I go to Greenville to-night (in the opposite direction). Dispositions for attacking the enemy at Jonesboro made. I will lose no time in doing as you order. No direct telegraphic communication as yet. Hope to get it to-morrow." The next day, while Rosecrans, after the brilliant flank movement which compelled the evacuation of Chattanooga, found his army on the eve of a terrible battle, Burnside telegraphed from Greenville: "Will obey your directions in reference to Rosecrans. Our troops occupy Jonesboro. Enemy retiring to Abingdon. Our cavalry in pursuit. Am now sending every man that can be spared to aid Rosecrans. I shall go on to Jonesboro. As soon as I learn the result of our movements to the east, will go down by railroad and direct the movements of reinforcements for Rosecrans. I have directed every available man in Kentucky to be sent here." On the 20th he received a dispatch from Halleck stating that General Meade did not believe that any of Ewell's troops had gone west, as Burnside had feared; that Longstreet, Johnston, and Bragg had concentrated against Rosecrans, who was on the Chickamauga River, twenty miles south of Chattanooga, closing thus: "He is expecting a battle, and wants you to sustain his left. Every possible effort must be made to assist him." To this Burnside replied from Knoxville on the 20th: "You may be sure I will do all I can for Rosecrans. Arrived here last night, and am hurrying troops in his direction. I go up the road to-night for a day."

The following dispatch received by Rosecrans on the battle field on the 19th, and that which follows on the 20th, shows that Halleck fully expected a junction of the two armies: "I have no direct communication with Burnside or Halleck. On the 15th Hurlbut says he is moving towards Decatur. I hear nothing of Sherman's troops ordered from Vicksburg. A telegram from Burnside on the 17th, just received, says my orders to move down to reinforce you will be obeyed as soon as possible. \* \* \* Burnside's cavalry ought to be near you by this time." That on the 20th is as follows: "General Burnside's instructions before he left Kentucky were to connect with your left. These instructions have been repeated five or six times, and he has answered that he was moving with that object. I think HIS ADVANCE CANNOT BE FAR FROM YOU." On the 21st: "Nothing heard from Burnside since the 19th. He was then sending to your aid all his available force. It is hoped that you will hold out until he reaches you. He was directed to connect

with you ten days ago. I can get no reply from Hurlbut or Sherman."

So the correspondence went on from day to day, and not a man was sent to Rosecrans. The battle of Chickamauga was fought on the 19th and 20th. The noble Army of the Cumberland, struggling against terrible odds, held its position even after the fatal blunder which opened its lines and admitted Polk's victorious legions upon its flanks. Obedience to the positive order of General Halleck would have brought the infantry of the Twenty-third Corps upon the field in ample time to retrieve the disaster if not to have prevented it. The force that required only a small portion of Burnside's troops to drive back from Knoxville to Jonesboro, and which virtually prevented the co-operation of Burnside with Rosecrans, has been already stated. This is how Burnside states it in his dispatch to Halleck of the 21st of September: "Before I knew of the necessity of sending immediate assistance to General Rosecrans I had sent a considerable portion of my force to capture and drive out a large force of the enemy under General Sam Jones, stationed on the road from Bristol to Jonesboro, which amounts to at least six thousand men." \* \*

While the correspondence above referred to was going on between the two generals in the field and their respective governments, active operations had been in progress along the line of the railroad east of Knoxville. September 8th Lieutenant-Colonel Hays, of the One Hundredth Ohio, and 300 men, had a skirmish at Carter's Station, where they were repulsed by Captain McClung with a brigade guard of 150 men in an entrenched position, when they fell back to Limestone Creek and awaited reinforcements. Meantime General Jackson with a portion of his brigade and Colonel Giltner with his regiment—1,800 in all—moved from Jonesboro and encountered Hays's battalion. After an engagement of two hours the latter surrendered 200 men with himself, the remainder having been killed or effected their escape. On the 10th Foster's brigade and the One Hundred and Third Ohio occupied Greenville, where it was joined on the 16th by Woodford's brigade and one regiment under General Haswell. Colonel Foster advanced on the 17th, and on the following day drove Colonel Carter's First Tennessee confederate regiment which had escaped from Cumberland Gap from the ford above Kingsport after a severe fight, and on the 19th

DROVE THE ENEMY OUT OF BRISTOL. General Jones had concentrated his troops at Jonesboro, where he joined them on the 14th. In his rear were the two railroad bridges over the Watauga at Carter's Station and over the Holston at Union. (The name of the latter place had been changed by the confederates to Zollieffer, in honor of the general of that name killed at Mill Springs.) As indicated in his telegram to Mr. Davis, General Jones withdrew his command on the 16th to Carter's Station, where it took position. Corse's brigade, having reached Abingdon, was directed to advance to Zollieffer. Foster's advance upon Kingsport on the 18th led past Jones's right flank considerably north of his position and gained his rear on the railroad at Bristol on the State line between Tennessee and Virginia. Foster destroyed the railroad for some distance on both sides of the town and a quantity of subsistence stores and returned the same night to Blountsville, sixteen miles northwest of Zollieffer, to which place Jones at once moved Corse's brigade with the intention of attacking him at daylight on the 20th. The Forty-fifth Virginia and Pettus's regiment, under command of Gen. Williams, were ordered to take part in the attack, but did not arrive until long after sunrise. Colonel Tyler, with the Sixteenth Georgia battalion and two companies of Carter's cavalry, which had been cut off from the railroad at Kingsport, moved forward and drew Foster out on the Zollieffer road, where he encountered the infantry, under General Corse, moving to turn his left. Foster came upon Williams, who had just gained position.

A BRISK SKIRMISH ENSUED, when Foster fell back to Blountsville, and thence towards Carter's Station, where on the 21st he was joined near that place by Cameron's infantry brigade of Haswell's division. Foster moved to Johnson's towards Johnsonsboro, leaving Cameron with his brigade, the Twelfth Kentucky cavalry, and a part of the Second Tennessee mounted infantry. The pickets skirmished on the 21st. On the following day Colonel Gilbert, with the First Brigade of Haswell's division, moved from Morristown towards Carter's Station. General Corse had returned to Blountsville to protect the rear from another raid by Foster, who reached there on the 22d, and a fight ensued. The forces on each side were about equal, and each had a battery of artillery. Foster drove the enemy, capturing seventy prisoners and one gun.

It was evidently General Burnside's intention to advance along the line of the railroad to the east. On the 22d he addressed the following letter to General Jones: "General: In the course of the movements of this army I may find it necessary to fire upon the villages occupied by your forces. In order to avoid accidents to non-combatants, I have the honor to request that you will cause immediate notice hereafter to be given to all such residents of those villages that they may remove themselves to a place of safety. No one of the villages will be fired upon before five o'clock p. m., to-day, and the flag of truce bearing this will terminate one hour after my officer arrives at your pickets. He is authorized to wait there that long for my message from you." To which General Williams replied as follows: "General: I have received your communication in the temporary absence of my superior officer, and the limited time set for the return of your flag prevents me from referring it to him. The short space allowed for the removal of non-combatants from the villages along the line of railroad occupied by confederate forces, does not seem to me consistent with the usages of civilized warfare, and particularly when you intimate that you are prepared to fire on a number of villages, and claim the right to do so at five o'clock p. m. to-day. I will ask you most respectfully how information can be conveyed to them, when it is now half-past four o'clock p. m." General Jones had become convinced of the danger of occupying a position so far in advance of the Salt Works, and ordered Williams to fall back from Carter's Station towards Zollieffer.

General Burnside says in his report: "I reached the extreme advance on the night of the 21st, and on the 22d made arrangements to attack the enemy's position at Watauga Bridge early on the morning of the 23d. I could see no way of extricating this portion of the command except by a demonstration of this kind. A cavalry brigade, under Colonel Foster, was sent around to threaten his rear, and on that night he evacuated the position, burning the bridge. I at once set all the forces, excepting a small portion of the cavalry, in motion down the valley to the relief of Rosecrans. I arrived in Knoxville late in the evening of the 24th."

The student of these campaigns cannot fail to be impressed with the folly of the War Department in attempting to direct the management of two separate armies operating upon parallel lines, eastward from their respective bases, by telegraph from a point a thousand miles distant, without giving to one commander extraordinary powers in case of emergency. The misfortune that attended the Army of the Cumberland could have been averted if Burnside had remained in Cincinnati, sending Hartsuff into East Tennessee. Burnside's commission antedated that of Rosecrans, as major-general, three days, and for this reason the latter could not order the Army of the Ohio to his assistance. General Burnside told Hartsuff that he could not go to Chattanooga, as he ranked Rosecrans, and confusion might arise; to which Hartsuff responded, "let me go, I don't rank him."

General Burnside, however, explains his action in the same report, as follows: "It should be remembered that up to the night of the 19th I was acting under instructions to occupy the upper country of East Tennessee, and all of my available forces were well up the valley above Knoxville. All that could be turned back were started at once, and as soon as possible the remainder were withdrawn from the presence of the enemy and turned back for the purpose of proceeding to the relief of General Rosecrans. The point where the troops were turned back on the 17th was 140 miles from Chattanooga, where Gen. Rosecrans was fighting on the 19th, and the advance of our forces was over 200 miles distant therefrom. It will be readily seen that under no circumstances could we have reached even the neighborhood of Gen. Rosecrans's forces during that battle. The troops were moved in that direction as rapidly as possible. Many dispatches passed between General Halleck and myself after this, in reference to going to Rosecrans's assistance after he had established himself at Chattanooga, and some misunderstandings occurred in regard to the purport of these dispatches. I was averse to doing what would in any way weaken our hold in East Tennessee, and he was anxious lest Rosecrans should not be able to hold Chattanooga. He was not disturbed at Chattanooga, and we held our ground in East Tennessee, so that what occurred in no way affected the result."

Regarding the two campaigns as one in their objects and the two armies as but the right and left wings of a grand army of invasion of confederate territory moving on parallel lines, under a common commander, it is reasonable to suppose that reinforcements from right to left would have been made as occasion demanded. The confederates regarded the destruction of the Army of the Cumberland as of paramount importance, and boldly massed an army in its front of sufficient magnitude, in their opinion, to accomplish that object. The temporary evacuation of Chattanooga southward was rendered necessary by the strategic movement of a large portion of Gen. Rosecrans's army upon Bragg's communications, but the feeling in the confederate army was an unwavering faith in their success. This feeling was shared by the people at large. Hundreds of families who had left their homes in Middle Tennessee and Kentucky, and kept in the rear of the confederate army in its retrograde movement, were congregated at Rome, Georgia. They had led a nomadic life, moving from Murfreesboro to Winchester, thence to Chattanooga and Rome, and, inspired with the hope of returning to their homes as the result of the defeat and pursuit of the Army of the Cumberland, they had their goods and baggage packed in wagons ready to follow the victorious flag of the confederacy northward to the Cumberland. The fancy of many took a wilder flight. Knowing that Rosecrans's army alone stood between the powerful host of veteran troops concentrating at Lafayette, and the Ohio River, it was not too much to hope that a vigorous pursuit of a disorganized army, demoralized by defeat, would carry the war into the North States.

The arrival of Longstreet's advance gave promise of an easy victory. Whatever may have been the overweening confidence of General Rosecrans in the strength of his army, and however much he may have underestimated that of his antagonist, as indicated by the speedy evacuation of Chattanooga, he no sooner became satisfied of the approach of reinforcements to Bragg from the Army of the Potomac than he saw the necessity of a corresponding increase of his own strength. A commanding-general, controlling the movements of both Rosecrans and Burnside, should, at this supreme moment, have had his headquarters at Chattanooga. The simultaneous capture of that city and Cumberland Gap took place on the 9th of September, and within three days thereafter two facts were well known to Burnside and Rosecrans. The former knew that no considerable force confronted him from the eastward, and that none was likely to advance from that direction, as Buckner had, in obedience to orders, evacuated the valley of the Tennessee—a thing which would not be likely to occur if the confederate war department designed to attempt holding that territory. General Rosecrans had ample evidence that a large army was being concentrated to give him battle. Both these facts would have been at once communicated to the commanding-general. General White's division of infantry, 3,000 strong, and Byrd's division of cavalry and mounted infantry, 2,000 strong, remained in the vicinity of London and Athens, within three days' march of Chattanooga, until the 15th of September, four days before the battle of Chickamauga, when White was ordered to Knoxville. The Ninth Army Corps was moving by easy marches from Crab Orchard, Kentucky, via Cumberland Gap to Knoxville. There was no reason why all Burnside's infantry could not have been sent to reinforce Rosecrans, leaving the cavalry and artillery to defend Knoxville. Cumberland Gap was amply defended by DeConcey's brigade, and the advance of the Ninth Army Corps reached its vicinity on the 17th, thus providing against any possibility of its recapture.

That a reinforcement of 10,000 effectives would have been ordered by forced marches to Chattanooga from Burnside's army by a commanding-general, stationed where he should have been, as early as the 13th, is as probable as any supposition that could be made with regard to the movements of troops at any juncture during the war. That the order was not given is due solely to the absence of a common commander, and his absence was what Napoleon termed "worse than a crime—a blunder."

EDISON THE INVENTOR.

The Great Electrician's Curious Courtship—Getting all about his Bride.

The correspondent of the Buffalo Commercial Advertiser, writing from this city, says: I met Tom Edison, the electrician, on Pennsylvania avenue the other day. He had run down from New York to look after his patients. He is looking well and is just as awkward and ungainly as ever. There has been a great deal of nonsense written about Edison, as there always is about every man who springs into fame with a bound. He is about 35 years of age and was born in Ohio.

"Stuck" Griffin, Edison's private secretary, once told me a family-characteristic story of the manner in which Edison came to get married. The idea was first suggested by an intimate friend, who made the point that he needed a mistress to preside over his big house, which was being managed by a housekeeper and several servants. I dare say the idea never occurred to him before, for he is known to be the shyest and most bashful of men, but he seemed pleased with the proposition and timidly inquired whom he should marry. The friend somewhat testily replied "anyone;" that a man who had so little sentiment in his soul as to ask such a question ought to be satisfied with anything that were a petticoat and was decent, and concluded by saying: "There are a number of nice girls employed in your factory over yonder; they aren't especially refined or cultivated, I must confess, but they are respectable, and that is the main consideration after all."

Edison looked them all over, and, after making his selection, put the question plumply to her. It was Edison's way of doing business, but it embarrassed the young lady all the same. She asked time to consider, and Edison granted her a week. At the end of that time she accepted him, and they were married without delay. They had decided to visit the New England States and Canada, and make quite an extended tour. As the bridal party drove to the station they passed his laboratory. Turning to his wife Edison excused himself for a few minutes, saying there were some matters that needed his attention, and that he would be at the station in time for the train. The train came and went, and so did several others, but no Edison. The bride, who knew his peculiarities, finally drove back to the house and waited her liege lord's pleasure. She never saw him again for forty-eight hours. Immersed in some idea that had suddenly occurred to him, he became oblivious to brides, honeymoons, or anything else.

MISS LIVINGSTON'S SUIT.

A suit for breach of promise of marriage has just been begun in the Kings County, N. Y., Supreme Court by Miss Mary Alice Almont Livingston against Henry Fleming, a wealthy young oil merchant of New York, who resides at an up-town hotel. Miss Livingston, who is said to be a descendant of Chancellor Robert R. Livingston, and is about twenty years old, claims \$175,000 damages against Mr. Fleming. She claims that after an acquaintance of several months he engaged himself to marry her, and that thereafter they associated intimately, but after a time he ceased to visit her, and then refused to keep his promise, although she has been and is ready to marry him. Miss Livingston is attractive, and it is said that she will receive an estate of \$350,000 when she reaches her twenty-first birthday. Mr. Fleming is a tall, stout man, of blonde complexion, under thirty years of age, and is said to have inherited a million of dollars. He recently received an increase in his fortune of \$500,000 by the death of his brother.

## G. A. R.



## CLOSE OF THE BALTIMORE ENCAMPMENT.

## REPORT OF COM'R MERRILL.

## STEADY GROWTH OF THE ORDER—THE NEW OFFICERS ELECTED.

Review of the Grand Parade and Other Features of the Celebration—Sketches of the New Grand Commander and Other Officers—The Next Encampment to be Held at Denver—Visit of Comrades to the Capitol.

The Sixteenth Annual Encampment Grand Army of the Republic, closed its sessions on Friday of last week, at Baltimore, and adjourned to meet at Denver, Colorado, next year. As has been anticipated, the Encampment proved the most notable in the history of the Grand Army. For the first time since the Order was established the Reunion was held in a Southern city; for the first time since the close of the late civil war there was not only a pleasant, encouraging of the "blue and the grey," but there were unmistakable evidences of the fact that the soldiers of North and South—the men who faced death on the battle-field from Bull Run to Appomattox, were sincere in their expressions of friendship when they addressed each other as "comrades," and declared that the past must be forgotten; and for the first time in the history of the Order all the Posts appeared in full uniform, thus heightening very greatly the interest in the public demonstration on the opening day. As THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE has largely increased its subscription list since the last issue we reproduce some of the more important features of the grand parade—a full account of which appeared in this journal of last week—for the benefit of new readers, and also in order that the present number may contain a complete record of everything of special interest that transpired at Baltimore. The convention met on Wednesday, June 21.

THE GRAND PARADE.

The great feature of the day was, of course, the parade, and it was in expectation of witnessing the most brilliant military pageant that had graced their streets since the war that the citizens of Baltimore gathered early in the morning along the advertised line of march, until it became almost impossible to clear a passage for the procession itself. It had been wisely determined to form the line in the eastern section of the city so as to admit of the Philadelphia, New York and Eastern Posts, some of whom did not arrive until quite late in the morning, taking position immediately upon leaving the cars, and as a consequence, there was very little of the delay and confusion usually incident to such occasions. It was ten o'clock when the head of the column moved westward along Baltimore street, the main thoroughfare of the city, and began to uncoil its brilliant length of gorgeous uniforms, glittering rifles, and gleaming banners before the cheering multitude. The line, which was under the command of General Romeyn B. Ayres, U. S. A., was in two divisions. The first, which embraced all the local and visiting militia, was commanded by General Jas. R. Herbert, a gallant officer in the confederate army during the late war, and the second, made up entirely of uniformed Posts of the Grand Army, with armed Posts, guards, and firing companies, was commanded by Commander-in-Chief General George S. Merrill.

With happy forethought the bands and drum corps had been instructed to play quick marching time (6-8ths), and there was as a consequence none of that painful lagging which so frequently characterizes the movements of large bodies. Naturally the military companies which composed the first division had for the spectators the greatest attraction, and indeed they presented a dazzling appearance in their showy uniforms, and marched, as a whole, with the precision of veterans. The Fifth Regiment, Maryland National Guards, the crack military regiment of the South, turned out nearly its full complement of men, and in its summer uniform of dress coat and white pants, made a superb display in the line. But after all, the chief feature of the parade was the imposing array of uniformed Posts of the Grand Army in the second division. The "Three Big Twos," as Dahlgren Post No. 2, of Boston, Post No. 2, of Philadelphia, and Post No. 2, of Washington, have been humorously christened, were applauded all along the line for their fine marching and soldierly appearance. The Boston men, in their white dress coats